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I. Introduction  
In 2018, almost 3,500 people filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission alleging religious-based discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (the (Act).1  The Act was enacted to prevent workplace discrimination against 
employees and applicants based on a variety of classifications including religion, sex, and race.  
A vitally important piece of legislation, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to 
promote equality in the workplace.2  It imposes an affirmative duty on employers to not 
discriminate against employees and potential employees.3  Further, if a conflict between an 
employee’s religious observance or practice arises and work requirements, the employer has an 
affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate, once it has been notified of such conflict.4  
However, the federal circuit courts do not agree on what constitutes a reasonable 
accommodation.  
Since its enactment, federal courts have disagreed about this standard.  A recent decision by 
the Eleventh Circuit deepened a divide among circuit courts as to the burden imposed on 
employers in religious discrimination cases.5  The Supreme Court has decided several Title VII 
cases, but it has not defined what constitutes a reasonable accommodation, instead providing 
 
1 Religion-Based Charges (Charges filed with EEOC), U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/religion.cfm (last visited November 9, 2019).  
2 Landmark Legislation, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilRightsAct1964.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2019). 
3 See e.g. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (2015); TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 
66 (1977); Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 727 F. App’x. 581, 584-85 (11th Cir. 2018) (cert. denied); Baker v. Home 
Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 2006). 
4 See e.g. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 66; Patterson, 727 F. App’x. at 584-85; Baker, 445 F.3d at 546. 
5 Patterson, 727 F. App’x at 590.  
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guidance on religious accommodation questions. 6 Therefore, circuit courts differ in 
interpretations of the Act.  Some courts have determined that, in order to reasonably 
accommodate an employee’s conflict, an employer is obligated to eliminate the conflict.7  Other 
courts, however, do not interpret the Act as establishing a hardline rule and instead focus on 
whether the accommodations offered were “reasonable,” even if they do not eliminate the 
conflict.8  Finally, some circuits have left it to the jury to determine the reasonableness.9  Thus, 
the federal circuits lack a uniform standard for determining whether an employer’s attempts to 
accommodate an employee’s religious conflict comply with Title VII.  
 This note will establish that, despite the division among circuit courts and the lack of 
clarity offered by the Supreme Court, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 imposes a duty on 
an employer to reasonably accommodate conflicts that arise between employment duties and its 
employees’ religious practices and beliefs.  Reasonable accommodations, however, do not equate 
to elimination.  Part II of this note gives the background on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
requirements established by the Act.  Part III delves into the case law, including the Supreme 
Court cases as well as the differing interpretations of the circuit courts. Finally, Part IV argues 
that Title VII does not impose a duty on employers to eliminate the conflict in order to satisfy the 
affirmative duty imposed by the statute.  Although there is not a hardline rule to determine what 
constitutes a reasonable accommodation, the ordinary meaning of the text, the legislative history, 
and Supreme Court cases all fail to support the notion that an employer is required to eliminate a 
conflict to comply with Title VII.   
 
6 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 63; Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 62 (1986). 
7 See Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F. 3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007); Baker, 445 F.3d at 
546; Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996). 
8 See Patterson, 727 F. App’x at 586; Sánchez-Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 637 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 
2012); Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1378 (6th Cir. 1994). 




II. BACKGROUND ON TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
After a moderate Civil Rights Act failed to pass in 1957, President John F. Kennedy 
proposed a more sweeping Civil Rights Act in 1963, H.R. 7152.10  Following President 
Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson advocated for the adoption of the Act.11  
Following a vote in favor of the bill by the House of Representatives, the bill faced staunch 
opposition in the Senate, particularly from southern senators, and was debated for 60 days.12  
Ultimately, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed into law on July 2, 1964.13  The Act was 
challenged shortly thereafter, but the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality.14 Almost a 
decade after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972 was signed.15  This 1972 Act was created primarily to give power to the EEOC to judicially 
enforce Title VII, thereby broadening the scope and power of the Act.16  The amendment also 




10 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Nat’l Park Serv. https://www.nps.gov/articles/civil-rights-act.htm (last updated: Mar. 
22, 2016).  
11 See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New 
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. Ps. L. Rev. 1417, 1456 (2003); Serena J. 
Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection: Congress, the Court, and the Civil Rights Acts, 16 J. L. & Politics 381, 393 
(2000); Delivering on a Dream: The House and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. House of Representatives, 
https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/Civil-Rights/1964-Essay/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2019); 
12 See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New 
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. Ps. L. Rev. 1417, 1471-73 (2003); Serena J. 
Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection: Congress, the Court, and the Civil Rights Acts, 16 J. L. & Politics 381, 395-96 
(2000). 
13 42 USCS § 2000e (2019).  
14 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the constitutionality of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 against a challenge that the statute exceeded Congress’ power to regulate commerce). 
15 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 92 Pub. L 261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
16 See Kirstin Sommers Czubkowski, Equal Opportunity: Federal Employees’ Right to Sue on Title VII and Tort 
Claims, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev 1841, 1845 (2013). 
17 Id. 
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Duties Created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 restricts the ability of employers to discriminate 
based on various classifications.  It was created to prevent race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin from inhibiting an individual’s job opportunities and growth.18  Subsequent amendments 
to the Act also created methods for rectifying such discrimination.19  Following the enactment, 
an employer cannot hire nor fire an employee, or discriminate in other respects, “because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”20  The Act prohibits employers from 
setting terms of employment, including compensation or privileges, based on these categories.21  
Furthermore, an employer cannot “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”22 
The statute now provides that religion “includes all aspects of religious observance and 
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably 
accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”23  This language was added 
in 1972, along with other modifications, to explicitly define the term religion as Congress 
intended it to be read within the statute.24  The Act, thus, does not merely forbid an employer 
from treating employees differently based on religion; instead, it requires that employers take 
steps to accommodate believes to the extent that work duties interfere with religious practices. 
 
18 § 2000e.  
19 Id.  
20 § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
21 Id.  
22 § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
23 § 2000e(j). 
24 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
 6 
Under the statute, a wide variety of religious discrimination cases have been litigated 
across the country.25  Employees or potential employees have filed suit alleging religious 
discrimination in a variety of situations, including a Seventh Day Adventist who was fired for 
refusing to work past sundown on Fridays,26 a member of the Worldwide Church of God who 
was forced to take time off without pay for religious observance,27  and a member of the Gospel 
Fellowship Church who was offered part-time employment when he notified his employer he 
could not work on Sundays.28   
As noted by courts litigating these conflicts, “the purpose of the reasonable 
accommodation provision is to “foster bilateral cooperation in resolving an employee’s religion-
work conflict.”29  The Supreme Court noted the emphasis of the Act and history of the Act is on 
eliminating discrimination.30  Thus, the goal of the Act, eliminating discrimination, guides 
litigation and court interpretations surrounding alleged religious discrimination.  
The origins of the duty to accommodate can be traced to  Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission regulations, interpreting the Act.31  In Riley v. Bendix Corp., the court noted that the 
“Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds . . . includes an 
obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs 
of employees and prospective employees where such accommodation can be made without 
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”32  This view, however, was not 
generally accepted, and, after the Supreme Court failed to resolve the question,33 Congress 
 
25 § 2000e-5. 
26 Sturgill, 512 F.3d at1027-29. 
27 Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 62-64. 
28 Baker, 445 F.3d at 543-45. 
29 Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1031, citing Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69. 
30 Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69. 
31 Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1115 (5th Cir. 1972). 
32 Id. quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. 
33 Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971). 
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amended the 1964 Act in order to essentially codify those regulations by adopting the current 
language. 34  Since that enactment, Congress has not amended the Act to define what constitutes 
a reasonable accommodation or what would be considered an undue hardship.  
Title VII imposes obligations on the employer as well. Because the Act creates positive 
responsibilities for the employer, courts have noted that the employer has an affirmative duty to 
reasonably accommodate the employee’s religious practices and observances, once the employee 
notifies the employer of the need for accommodation.35  It is the responsibility of the employee 
to alert the employer of a religious conflict.36  An employer can refuse to accommodate the 
conflict if it can demonstrate that all available accommodations would result in an undue 
hardship.37  When examining whether an employer has abided by Title VII, courts find that if an 
accommodation is reasonable, the employer has satisfied the requirements.38  The inquiry stops 
there.39  What constitutes reasonable is fact specific and employers, though offered guidelines, 
are not limited to specific actions.40  The employer needs to consider whether the alternatives for 
accommodation would disadvantage the employee in terms of opportunities, including 
compensation or privileges of employment, when determining whether the accommodation 
offered was reasonable.41   
 
34 45 FR 72610 §1605.3.  
35 Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1467. 
36 Cooper, 15 F.3d at 1378 citing Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987). See also, 
Sánchez-Rodriguez, 637 F.3d at 13 citing Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 133 (1st Cir. 2004). An 
employee who seeks an accommodation, and sues when it is denied, bears the burden of establishing a prima facie 
case of discrimination by “showing that he holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment 
requirement; that he has informed his employer of the conflict; and that he was discharged or disciplined for failing 
to comply with the conflicting requirement.” 
37 Sánchez-Rodriguez, 637 F.3d at 8. See § 2000e(j). If the employee establishes a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to “demonstrate[] that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to 
an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of 
the employer’s business.” 
38 Patterson, 727 F. App’x. at 586. 
39 Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 68. 
40 § 1605.2(c)(2). 
41 Id.  
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The CFR outlines several categories which are considered types of reasonable 
accommodations, including shift swaps, voluntary substitutes, flexible scheduling, and lateral 
transfers and change of job assignments.42  The regulation notes that this is not an all-inclusive 
list of what could constitute a reasonable accommodation.43  When detailing the types of 
adjustments that could be considered reasonable accommodations, the regulation suggests 
employers “promote an atmosphere in which substitutions are favorably regarded,” provide a 
“bulletin board or other means for matching voluntary substitutes with positions for which 
substitutes are needed,” “floating or optional holidays,” “staggered work hours,” and “use of 
lunch time in exchange for early departure” among others.44  Neither the regulations nor the Act 
provide an exhaustive list nor define what constitutes a reasonable accommodation, thereby 
creating a standard that is subject to interpretation.  
Although the employer has the burden to reasonably accommodate an employee’s 
conflict, the employer is not required to do so if accommodations would inflict undue hardship 
on it.  The Act provides that an employer must accommodate the employee’s conflict unless the 
accommodation would create “an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”45  
Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court found that requiring an employer to bear “more than 
a de minimis cost” would constitute a hardship.46  The CFR, citing the Supreme Court’s 
standard, notes that de minimis cost should be determined on a case-by-case basis.47  Various 
factors specific to the case should be considered, including the cost of premium wages necessary 
for substitutes, the size and operating cost of the employer, and the number of individuals who 
 
42 § 1605.2(d). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 § 2000e(j). 
46 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84. 
47 § 1605.2(e) citing Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84. 
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would require accommodations.48  Thus, similar to the reasonable accommodation standard, the 
Act does not create a hardline rule for what constitutes an undue hardship.  
While not directly addressing the definition of reasonable accommodation, the Supreme 
Court has ruled on Title VII cases pertaining to religious discrimination and has clarified some 
obligations imposed on both employers and employees.49  In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Hardison, the Supreme Court examined the history of Title VII to determine whether the 
accommodations offered by an airline were reasonable.50  The Court stipulated that, “like the 
EEOC guidelines, the statute provides no guidance for determining the degree of accommodation 
that is required of an employer.”51  Hardison, a sales clerk for TWA and member of the 
Worldwide Church of God, was fired after refusing to work on his Sabbath in accordance with 
his church’s teachings.52  His proposed accommodations included working a four-day work week 
instead of five, finding someone to swap shifts, and switching positions were not mutually 
accepted.53   
The Court found that the employer acted reasonably in attempting to find the employee 
another job and authorizing the union steward to search for someone to switch shifts.54  While 
acknowledging the alternatives suggested by the court of appeals, the Court also found that the 
company could not “be faulted for having failed to work out a shift or job swap” given the 
collective bargaining agreement in place.55  The Court noted that the alternatives suggested by 
the lower court would require the employer to bear more than a de minimis cost because it would 
 
48 § 1605.2(e). 
49 See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 63; Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 60. 
50 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 71-74. 
51 Id. at 74.  
52 Id. at 66-69. 
53 Id. at 77. 
54 Id. at 77. 
55 Id. at 78-79. 
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be required to pay for an additional employee to work on Saturday or it would have to give the 
employee preferential treatment over other employees.56  This would result in an undue hardship, 
which Title VII specifies is not necessary.57   
In Ansonia Board of Educ. v. Philbrook, the Supreme Court commented on the 
congressional intention behind the statute, finding that the statute “did not impose a duty on the 
employer to accommodate at all costs.”58  Philbrook was a high school teacher and member of 
the Worldwide Church of God, which required members to refrain from working during 
specified holy days.59  The school board allowed three missed days for religious observances but 
Philbrook needed to miss six days.60  The Court found that the suggestion of taking unpaid leave 
to enable the employee to observe the remaining religious holidays would eliminate the 
conflict.61  The Court, however, then said that, despite eliminating the conflict, unpaid leave may 
not be a reasonable accommodation if employees were allowed to take paid leave for all other 
reasons, beyond religious ones.62  The Court also noted that “Senator Randolph, the sponsor of 
the amendment that became [the statute], expressed his hope that accommodation would be made 
with ‘flexibility’ and a desire to achieve an adjustment.”63 
Philbrook does establish that, if the employer does offer a reasonable accommodation, 
the duty is satisfied even if the employee would prefer a different accommodation. If, however, 
an employer does not offer a reasonable accommodation, in order to satisfy the burden created 
by Title VII, it must show that it did not offer a reasonable accommodation because doing so 
 
56 Hardison, 432 U.S at 84. 
57 Id. at 84-5. 
58 Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 70. 
59 Id. at 62. 
60 Id. at 63. 
61 Id. at 70. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 69. 
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would have created an undue hardship.  Case law has further defined an undue hardship, creating 
potentially a lower bar for employers, although a hardline rule is impractical. In Hardison, the 
Court found the potential for unequal treatment of employees based on religion could constitute 
an undue hardship when combined with the additional costs the employer would bear to pay for a 
replacement on Saturday.64  Courts have considered a wide range of factors when determining 
whether an accommodation would create an undue hardship, including cost in efficiency or wage 
expenditures, loss of production, and the cost of replacing a worker.65  The Supreme Court found 
that the employer would bear an undue hardship if it was required to give the employee the 
requested day off and incur a cost by paying for his substitute.66  In addition to considering the 
hardship on the employer, courts have suggested that the hardship imposed on other employees 
by the accommodation may be considered.67  Courts have noted that it is unlikely Congress 
intended to allow for shift swaps or accommodations for some employees at the expense of 
contractual rights of other employees.68   
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT DEFINING WHAT CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION 
Given the lack of clarity provided by Title VII in terms of what constitutes a reasonable 
accommodation, courts have interpreted the statute in different ways, thereby requiring different 
levels of accommodation from employers.  Some courts require an employer to offer reasonable 
accommodations, but do not require the employer to completely eliminate the conflict.  Other 
courts leave it to the jury to determine whether an accommodation should be considered 
 
64 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84. 
65 Tabura, 880 F.3d at 557-58. 
66 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84. 
67 Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1468. 
68 Cooper, 15 F.3d at 1380. 
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reasonable.  Finally, other courts require that an employer completely eliminate the burden to 
comply with the requirements of Title VII.  Thus, the federal courts lack a uniform standard with 
which to judge whether an employer has complied with Title VII.  
A. Courts Requiring That an Employer Reasonably Accommodate a Conflict, but Not 
Eliminate It 
A number of federal courts have ruled that an employer is not required to eliminate a 
conflict between a work obligation and an employee’s religious practice or observance in order 
to comply with Title VII, but it must reasonably accommodate.  Most recently, in Patterson v. 
Walgreen Co., Patterson was fired after he failed to show up for work on several occasions on 
his Sabbath.69  Walgreens allowed him to swap shifts, but Patterson could not always find 
someone to cover his shifts, and he turned down an offer from Walgreens to switch to a position 
that would decrease the likelihood he would have to work on Sabbath because Walgreens could 
not guarantee he would not have to work on it.70  The court found that Walgreens offered 
reasonable accommodations and did not violate Title VII.71  The Eleventh Circuit cited Walden 
v. Centers For Disease Control & Prevention, in which it had previously held that “a reasonable 
accommodation is one that ‘eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and 
religious practices.’”  However, because Walgreens offered accommodations that would have 
enhanced the likelihood of avoiding the conflict, even if not completely eliminating it, it was 
considered reasonable.72  The court also noted that employers are not required to give employees 
a choice of accommodation or offer the preferred accommodation, so long as the accommodation 
 
69 Patterson, 727 F. App’x at 584-85. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 587. 
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offered is reasonable.73  Patterson furthered the standard implemented by several other circuits: 
that an employer is not required to eliminate a conflict to comply with Title VII.74 
In addition to Patterson, other circuits have interpreted Title VII and Supreme Court 
cases to require employers to reasonably accommodate without necessarily having to eliminate 
the conflict.  In Sánchez-Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., the First Circuit found that the 
combination of adjustments offered by AT&T constituted reasonable accommodations.75  
Although some of the options offered by the employer were not reasonable, such as offering to 
move the employee to a position with a lower salary, when looking at the combination of 
options, the accommodations could be considered reasonable.76  The court found that because the 
employer offered “a series of attempts by [the employer] to accommodate,” the employer had 
met the standard required, even if the offered accommodations did not necessarily eliminate the 
conflict.77  The court noted that the totality of circumstances and combination of approaches 
should be examined; however, the court did not leave it to a jury to determine reasonableness.78 
In Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., the Sixth Circuit found that the employer failed to reasonably 
accommodate its employee, a Seventh Day Adventist, because it accommodated one of her 
concerns but failed to accommodate her objection to working on the Sabbath.79  The court noted 
an employer cannot address only one of the religious concerns, but it did not indicate that the 
employer would be required to completely eliminate the conflict in order to comply with the 
 
73 Id. at 588. 
74 Id. at 587. 
75 Sánchez-Rodriguez, 637 F.3d at 13.  
76 Id. at 12-13. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. citing Hudson v. Western Airlines, Inc., 851 F. 2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1988); quoting Sturgill v. UPS, 512 F.3d 
1024, 1030 (8th Cir. 2008) (“What is reasonable depends on the totality of the circumstances and therefore might, or 
might not, require elimination of a particular, fact-specific conflict.”) 
79 Cooper, 15 F.3d at 1379.  
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Act.80  It found that the use of vacation days to avoid working on Sabbath could not be the only 
accommodation offered, but the use of vacation days in combination in conjunction with other 
solutions may be acceptable.81  Thus, these courts interpreted Title VII, as well as Hardison and 
Ansonia, to require that an employer reasonably accommodate a conflict but not as having 
created a hardline rule. 
Some lower courts have determined that whether an employer has reasonably 
accommodated a religious conflict is a question for the jury.  However, these circuits have noted 
that it incorrect to instruct the jury that the conflict must be eliminated in order to be considered 
reasonable.82  In Sturgill v. UPS, the Eighth Circuit held that the reasonableness of an 
accommodation was for the jury to determine.83  The court rejected the employee’s contention 
that the employer was required to eliminate the conflict while also rejecting the employer’s 
contention that it was merely required to offer a religion-neutral way for the conflict to be 
minimized.84  The court held that there might be some cases where the only reasonable 
accommodation requires elimination of the conflict.85  However, mirroring the logic of the 
Eleventh and Sixth Circuits, the court clarified that the lower court was incorrect to instruct the 
jury that “’an accommodation is reasonable if it eliminates the conflict,’” instead holding 
reasonableness is a fact specific inquiry.86  The court held that, in “close cases,” the jury should 
determine whether the accommodations were reasonable, given the factual aspect of the 
question.87  In Tabura v. Kellogg USA, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case after the district 
 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 Tabura, 880 F.3d at 550; Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1031.  
83 Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1033.  
84 Id. at 1030.  
85 Id. at 1033. 
86 Id. 1030. 
87 Id. at 1033. 
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court granted the employer summary judgment, noting that determining the reasonableness of an 
accommodation is a fact-specific inquiry that is made on a case-by-case basis.88  In declining to 
adopt the employees’ suggested per se rule requiring the accommodation to “totally” or 
“completely” eliminate the conflict, the court states that “Title VII expressly requires only that 
an employer reasonably accommodate an employee’s religion.”89  The employer was not 
required to guarantee the employees would never have to work on Saturday, but it would not be a 
reasonable accommodation to swap them off of only some Saturday shifts.90  The court 
commented that the “elimination” language used by the employees and various courts stemmed 
from language used in Ansonia, noting, however, that the Ansonia court did not hold that an 
accommodation would categorically be considered unreasonable if it did not eliminate the 
conflict.91  Finally, finding that the reasonableness of the offered accommodations was a 
disputed material fact, the court ruled it was for the jury to determine.92  Even when courts leave 
it to the jury to determine the reasonableness of the accommodations offered, the jury is not 
required to find that the employer eliminated the conflict to comply with the Act. 
B. Courts Requiring That an Employer Eliminate a Conflict 
Some circuits interpret the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Supreme Court cases to require 
employers to completely eliminate the employee’s religious conflict in order to comply with the 
statute’s reasonable accommodation requirement.  In Baker v. Home Depot, the Second Circuit 
held that an employer’s offer to move an employee’s shift later in the day was an unreasonable 
accommodation as it did not eliminate the conflict.93  Baker, a member of the Gospel Fellowship 
 
88 Tabura, 880 F.3d at 551.  
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 550. 
91 Id. at 551. 
92 Id. at 555.  
93 Baker, 445 F.3d at 548. 
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Church which restricted members from working on their Sabbath, refused to work on Sundays.94  
The only accommodation offered by his employer was being assigned to a later Sunday shift to 
enable him to attend church services in the morning.95  The court considered the accommodation 
unreasonable because, although it would enable the employee to attend church, he would still be 
required to work on his Sabbath, so the conflict was only partially addressed.96  Similarly, in 
EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, the Seventh Circuit held that an employer did not offer a reasonable 
accommodation when its only offered solution to an employee who asked for Yom Kippur off 
was to offer another day off, thereby not eliminating the conflict.97 
In Opuku-Boateng v. California, the Ninth Circuit held that the employer is required to 
eliminate the conflict in order for it have reasonably accommodated the religious conflict.98  
When a temporary employee, a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church notified his 
employer that he could not work on his Sabbath, he was denied permanent employment.99  The 
court held that “where the negotiations do not produce a proposal by the employer that would 
eliminate the religious conflict, the employer must either accept the employee’s proposal or 
demonstrate that it would cause undue hardship were it to do so.”100  Because the court found 
that, although the employer was willing to negotiate, it did not offer an accommodation, nor did 
it accept the employee’s suggestion, it thereby violated Title VII.101   
 
94 Id. at 543-44. 
95 Id. at 545. 
96 Id. at 547. See also, EEOC v. Ilona of Hung., 108 F.3d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir. 1997); Hudson, 851 F. 2d at 266 
(finding that “all that is required” of an employer is providing “‘the means through which [the employee] could have 
eliminated her religious conflict while preserving her employment status.’”) 
97 Ilona of Hung., 108 F.3d at 1576. 
98 Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1467.  
99 Id. at 1465-66. 
100 Id. at 1467. 
101 Id. at 1469. 
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In Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., the court, citing Philbrook, asserted 
that the Supreme Court equates a reasonable accommodation to one that eliminates the 
conflict.102  In this case, the employer permitted the employee to swap shifts with other 
employees, thereby enabling her to avoid the conflict altogether.103  Several circuit courts have 
interpreted Title VII and the Supreme Court cases as establishing a burden on employers to 
eliminate a conflict to comply with the statute. 
IV. EMPLOYERS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ELIMINATE THE CONFLICT 
Employers are required only to reasonably accommodate, not eliminate, the conflict in 
order to comply with Article VII.  The language of the statute itself merely demands that 
employers reasonably accommodate employees’ religious conflicts.  The statute does not define 
accommodation; the statute, moreover, does not contain the word eliminate, nor does the 
language suggest elimination and accommodation are synonymous.  In addition, neither the 
legislative history nor amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 equate the duty imposed on 
employers to accommodate a religious conflict with a duty to eliminate that conflict.  Finally, the 
Supreme Court has not interpreted the Act to establish a hardline rule that an employer must 
eliminate the conflict.  Rather, the Court has not yet defined what a reasonable accommodation 
means, nor has it created a test to determine what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.  
Therefore, an employer is required to reasonably accommodate its employees’ religious 
conflicts, but Title VII does not require an employer to eliminate the conflict.   
A. Neither the Act nor Its Legislative History Create a Burden to Eliminate the Conflict 
Title VII does not require an employer to eliminate the conflict between an employee’s 
religious practice or observance and a work commitment in order to comply with the statute.  
 
102 Id. at 1322. 
103 Id. at 1323. 
 18 
The word “eliminate” does not appear in the Act as it pertains to discrimination in workplaces.104  
Instead, the statute merely commands employers to reasonably accommodate its employees’ 
religious observances and practices, absent an undue hardship.105  The Supreme Court has noted 
that, where possible, statutes should be read based on their plain meaning and ordinary 
language.106  In Bond v. United States, the Court stated “in settling on a fair reading of a statute, 
it is not unusual to consider the ordinary meaning of a defined term.”107  In FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 
the Court noted that “when a statute does not define a term, we typically ‘give the phrase it’s 
ordinary meaning.’”108  Following a grant of summary judgment in favor Walgreens by the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida and an affirmation by the Eleventh 
Circuit, the Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United 
States in the Patterson case.109  Taking up this theme, in the United States’ amicus brief for 
Patterson, the United States uses various sources to define accommodate as “to make suitable,” 
“adjust, ” “adapt.” 110  The United States also cites the ADA’s interpretation of the term 
accommodate, which “conveys the need for effectiveness.”111  However, none of the definitions 
for accommodate equate an accommodation to an elimination.  Based on an ordinary reading of 
 
104 §§ 2000e -2(a),(j) 
105 § 2000e(j) 
106 See Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 861 (2014); FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011) quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 599 U.S. 133, 138 (2010). See also, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, 
supporting Petitioner, Patterson, 727 F. App’x (No. 18-349) (“‘the terms should be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’”) 
107 Bond, 572 U.S. at 861.  
108 FCC, 562 U.S. at 403 quoting Johnson, 599 U.S. at 138. 
109 Patterson v. Walgreen Co. – Petition for certiorari denied February 24, 2020, Supreme Court of the United 
States Blog https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/patterson-v-walgreen-co/ (last visited March 30, 2020). 
110 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-11, supporting Petitioner, Patterson, 727 F. App’x (No. 18-
349) (quoting American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 8 (1969).) The United States argued that cert 
should be granted but in a limited scope. The US did not think the Court should clarify whether an employer needs 
to eliminate a conflict to comply with Title VII nor should it comment on whether an undue hardship analysis could 
include speculative hardships. The US recommended the Court only revisit the Hardison decision which created the 
de minimis cost standard.  
111 Id. at 10 (citing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (42 
U.S.C. 12101 et seq.) 
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the statute, Congress did not intend to force employers to completely eliminate a conflict based 
on religion.  Instead, the plain meaning of the word accommodate indicates that both parties are 
required to work towards a resolute and adapt to a conflict effectively.  In some cases, to 
effectively address a conflict, an employer may eliminate it.  However, the Act does not require 
an employer to eliminate a conflict to make the situation suitable for an employee.   
In addition, the statute does not require an employer to allow an employee to choose the 
preferred accommodation.112  Thus, the employee is not allowed to select her preferred 
accommodation, which may be the one that eliminates the conflict, so long as the offered 
resolution is reasonable.  Other employment-based legislation that is designed to prevent 
discrimination similarly embraces a flexible standard rather than a hardline rule.113  The 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was enacted to eliminate discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities and provide an enforcement mechanism to prevent discrimination in 
daily life.114  Similar to Title VII, the ADA requires employers to reasonably accommodate 
employees.115  The ADA also does not define what constitutes a reasonable accommodation, but 
instead offers examples of what can be considered a reasonable accommodation.116  This 
requirement is further explained as a broad one but a requirement that does contain limitations.117  
An employer does not have to modify facilities or services to create complete parity in working 
conditions between disabled and non-disabled employees; the employer also does not need to 
excuse past performance issues.118  Thus, parallels can be drawn between the two federal statutes 
 
112 Patterson, 727 F. App’x. at 586. 
113 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336 104 Stat. 327, 330. 
114 Id. at 329. 
115 Id. at 331. 
116 Id.; US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 393 (2002) (holding that the employee’s proposed accommodation 
was not reasonable because it conflicted with a seniority system.) 
117 Jonathan R. Mook, Americans with Disabilities Act: Employee Rights and Employer Obligations, § 6.01. 
118 Id. citing Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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in which Congress pointedly did not define reasonable accommodation, enabling it to be a 
flexible standard.119  
In addition to the statute itself, the legislative history suggests that the reasonable 
accommodation standard is flexible, rather than a strict requirement that employers must 
eliminate a conflict.  The purpose of Title VII is to ensure workers are not discriminated in the 
hiring process, and while employed, based on their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.120  
As originally enacted, Title VII did not impose any accommodation requirements on employers, 
instead just prohibiting religious discrimination.121  The Act is not designed to place the burden 
entirely on employers.122  Instead, it is designed to promote “bilateral cooperation” between 
employers and employees.123  Thus, it is an unfair reading of the Act to place the onus entirely on 
the employer by forcing it to completely remove the burden.  While the employer does not have 
to accommodate if it would create an undue hardship, the Act does not equate eliminate and 
accommodate.  Instead, the employer is required to offer an effective solution to allow both the 
employer and employee to adapt.  Although the undue hardship provision can be viewed as a 
safeguard to ensure employers do not have to accommodate at all costs, that is only the second 
 
119 See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542. The court noted that accommodation means that an employer “must be willing 
to make changes” but also founded that reasonable qualifies or, “in a sense weakens,” the term. The court found that, 
even within its capabilities, an employer was not required to go to extreme lengths to completely enable the 
employee to work. See also Merrit v. Boise Cascade Corp., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 39589 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming 
dismissal of plaintiff’s claims because the employer accommodated the employee after he returned to work far 
longer and more fully than needed.) 
120 § 2000e; § 1614.101(a); see Michael D. Moberly, Bad News for Those Proclaiming The Good News?: The 
Employer’s Ambiguous Duty to Accommodate Religious Proselytizing, 42 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (noting the 
primary goal of the legislation was to eliminate racial discrimination and religion was added as somewhat of an 
afterthought.)  
121 See EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1988) ("As originally enacted, Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 simply prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of religion."); Smith v. Pyro 
Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1087 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Title VII, as enacted in 1964, prohibited religious discrimination 
in employment, but went no further.") 
122 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
123 Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1031, citing Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69. 
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step of the analysis.124  Based on the purposes of the statute, it can be inferred that Congress did 
not intend to unduly hinder an employer’s ability to conduct business by forcing it to fully 
eliminate every conflict that arose.  In some cases, depending on an employee’s religious 
practice or observance, a reasonable accommodation may result in the elimination of the conflict, 
resulting in an examination of whether that accommodation results in an undue hardship.  
However, just because some accommodations result in an elimination of the conflict, the Act 
does not establish that as the mandatory standard for all employers.  Elimination may be 
sufficient to comply with Title VII, but it is not necessary. 
In addition, in 1972, Congress implemented a series of modifications to the Civil Rights 
Act, some of which clarified the existing Act and some of which built upon the Act to be more 
inclusive. 125  Prior to the 1972 amendment, several courts interpreted Title VII to not require a 
reasonable accommodation for religious beliefs.126  Senator Jennings Randolph, who proposed 
the amendments, believed that “the persons on both sides of this situation, the employer and the 
employee, . . . are just building upon a conviction, and hopefully, understanding and a desire to 
achieve an adjustment.”127  His amendments were unanimously approved in the Senate and 
approved in the House.128   Some commentators argue that this amendment created a higher 
standard for employers that requires them to eliminate the conflict and avoid disadvantaging an 
 
124 § 2000e. 
125 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972); 118 Cong. Rec. 705 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph) (noting that he 
was a Seventh-Day Baptist and his observance of the Sabbath began at sundown on Friday and ended at Sunday on 
Saturday.)  
126 See Michael D. Moberly, Bad News for Those Proclaiming The Good News?: The Employer’s Ambiguous Duty 
to Accommodate Religious Proselytizing, 42 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1, 12 (2001) (citing Reid v. Memphis Publishing 
Co., 468 F.2d 346, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1972) (“quoting lower court's conclusion that there is ‘no duty on the part of an 
employer to accommodate an employee's or potential employee's religious belief’"); Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 
511, 514 (E.D. Va. 1971) ("’Religious discrimination should not be equated with failure to accommodate.’") 
127 118 Cong. Rec. 706 (1972).  
128 See 118 Cong. Rec. 7169, 7573 (1972). 
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employee in any way.129  When defining the term religion, Congress did not create a definitive 
standard in terms of what is expected from an employer when an employee raises a religious 
conflict.130  Instead, Congress set the bar at reasonable accommodation; there is nothing within 
the notes from the amendment to indicate that Congress intended the bar to be any higher or 
requirements to be any stricter than reasonable.131  Therefore, the Act creates merely an 
obligation to reasonably accommodate, nothing further.  
Finally, the CFR emphasizes only the need to reasonably accommodate a conflict; it does 
not set a threshold for what constitutes reasonable.  In clarifying “the obligation imposed by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,” the CFR does not mention a duty to eliminate the conflict created by 
an employee’s religious practices or observances and work obligations.132  The language in the 
section does not draw a hardline and, instead, offers a variety of potential solutions to enable an 
employer to reasonably accommodate.133  Absent is the implication that an employer should be 
forced into action to fully ameliorate the conflict; rather, the regulations emphasize easing the 
burden on employees with religious conflicts.134  The regulations even note that “[i]n a number 
of cases, the securing of a substitute has been left entirely up to the individual seeking 
accommodation.”135  The regulation encourages employers to facilitate such swaps.136  It 
emphasizes the expectation that both the employee and employer will work to create a solution 
 
129 Dallan Flake, Restoring Reasonableness to Workplace Religious Accommodations 4 (Feb. 15, 2020) 
(unpublished comment) (on file with author). Flake notes that reasonableness is a standalone requirement under 
Title VII, however, his interpretation is too far-reaching and places too significant of an onus on employers. His 
interpretation requires the accommodation completely eliminate the conflict, not cause the employee to suffer 
adverse employment action, and not unnecessarily disadvantage the employee’s terms of conditions of employment. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. See Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 72 (quoting the sponsor of the amendment to the Act, Senator Rudolph, who hoped 
the “accommodation would be made with ‘flexibility’ and ‘a desire to achieve an adjustment.’”) 
132 § 1605.2. 
133 Id. 
134 § 1605.2(d). 
135 § 1605.2(d)(i). 
136 Id. 
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that enables the employee to continue to work for the employer.137  It does not establish a 
threshold for reasonableness.  Based on the regulations, an inference that an employer is 
expected to eliminate the religious conflict is an overstatement of the burden placed on 
employers.  
B. The Supreme Court Did Not Create a Standard that Requires the Employer to Eliminate 
the Conflict  
Several circuit courts have rightly interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to mean that 
an employer has an affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious 
practices and observances once informed of them; an employer, however, is not required to 
eliminate the conflict to have reasonably accommodated the conflict.  Although the Supreme 
Court has not definitively defined reasonable accommodation in the Title VII context, the Court 
has addressed religious conflicts arising under Title VII.138  In these cases, the Court has not 
established a hardline rule for when an accommodation will be considered reasonable.139  In 
Ansonia, the Court found “no basis in either the statute or its legislative history for requiring an 
employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation.”140  In this case, the Court 
analyzed a potential accommodation, saying it eliminated the conflict; however, the Court 
indicated that this accommodation would not be considered reasonable as it still discriminated 
based on religion.141  Although the Court used the term eliminate in this case, it did not establish 
this as the standard to determine reasonable accommodations.  The Court merely noted the 
potential accommodation had the effect of eliminating the conflict.  A reading of Ansonia further 
 
137 Id. 
138 Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 62; Hardison, 432 U.S. at 66. 
139 Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69. 
140 Id. at 68. 
141 Id. at 70. 
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supports the notion that an employer is not required to eliminate the conflict to comply with the 
Act as the Court notes that the employer is not required to give the employee a choice of 
accommodations and instead is able to choose an accommodation it prefers.142  Neither 
legislative history nor the statute require an employer to choose a specific accommodation.143  If 
an employer was required to eliminate the conflict to comply with the Act, the Supreme Court 
would not need to specify that employers retained the choice of accommodations.  Finally, the 
Court rejects the standard outlined by the lower court which would give an employee “every 
incentive to hold out for the most beneficial accommodation, despite the fact that an employer 
offers a reasonable resolution of the conflict.”144  This furthers the point that Title VII calls for 
bilateral cooperation and the onus is not entirely on the employer.  If the statute required 
elimination, the employee would not have to wait for the most beneficial accommodation, 
because all offered would end with the same result.  Thus, the Supreme Court, in Ansonia, did 
not determine that an accommodation must eliminate the conflict to be considered reasonable. 
Similarly, in Hardison, the Court did not establish a hardline rule. The Court notes that the 
EEOC did not define reasonable accommodation when amending its guidelines.145  However, it 
found that, in this case, the employer made reasonable efforts to accommodate the conflict.146  
The employer held several meetings with the employee during which it tried to find solutions 
and also authorized the union steward to find someone to switch shifts.147  In addition, the 
employer tried unsuccessfully to find him another job.148  Despite these failed attempts, the Court 
found these proffered accommodations reasonable and the employer could not “be faulted for 
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having failed to work out a shift or job swap” for the employee.149  The Court did not mention a 
requirement to eliminate the conflict and instead focuses on the efforts of the employer to 
comply with the Act and reasonably accommodate its employee.  Again, the Supreme Court 
analyzed whether an employer reasonably accommodated its employee within the meaning of 
Title VII and did not establish a requirement to eliminate the conflict. 
Numerous circuit courts have, based on a plain reading of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
an interpretation of the Supreme Court decisions, have determined that an employer needs to 
reasonably accommodate an employee’s conflict without establishing a threshold of what 
constitutes a reasonable accommodation.  These courts analyzed the facts of individual cases to 
determine whether that employer reasonably accommodated its employee’s conflict.150   In 
Patterson, the court held that the employer was not required to guarantee that the employee 
would never work on his Sabbath because it offered several accommodations that attempted to 
reduce the likelihood he would be asked to work on his Sabbath.151  Following the guidance of 
the CFR, the court noted that the employer facilitated the employee’s attempts to swap shifts, but 
was not required to actively assist or ensure he could swap.152  Because the employer offered 
accommodations that “enhanced the likelihood of avoiding” the conflict, it satisfied its duties 
under Title VII.153  Similarly, in Sánchez-Rodriguez, the court noted the importance of 
examining the totality of the circumstances, echoing the flexibility approach highlighted in 
Ansonia.154  Even where the court held that determining reasonableness is for the jury to 
determine, it has also noted that the standard for reasonableness does not equate to elimination.  
 
149 Id. at 78-79. The Court did not specify, however, whether it was referring to an unreasonable accommodation or 
an undue hardship in this context.  
150 Patterson, 727 F. App’x at 587; Sánchez-Rodriguez, 637 F.3d at 13; Cooper, 15 F.3d at 1379. 
151 Patterson, 727 F. App’x At 587. 
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154 Sánchez-Rodriguez, 637 F.3d at 13; Cooper, 15 F.3d at 12. 
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In Tabura, the court pointed out that Ansonia did not stand for the notion that an 
“accommodation could never be reasonable if it failed totally and under every conceivable fact 
scenario to eliminate every conflict or all tension.”155  Instead, the Supreme Court cases should 
be interpreted as finding a reasonable accommodation when the employer completely eliminates 
the conflict.156  That does not mean that the employer must eliminate the conflict to act in 
accordance with the Act.157  
Other courts, on the other hand, have interpreted the Supreme Court cases to impose a higher 
standard on employers than what Title VII dictates.  Several circuits have created a standard that 
requires employers to eliminate the conflict, rather than just reasonably accommodating.158  In 
Ilona of Hungary, the court cited Ansonia as the basis for requiring the employer eliminate the 
conflict between the employment requirement and the religious practice.159  However, the court 
did not explain how it established the standard beyond merely citing to Supreme Court cases.160  
The court created a standard that neither the Supreme Court nor the statute dictates, thus 
increasing the burden placed on employers to satisfy the requirements of Title VII.  Similarly, in 
Baker, the court cites Ilona of Hungary in finding that the employer is required to eliminate the 
conflict.161  This court, however, fails to point to evidence supporting that standard, merely 
equating eliminating the conflict to a reasonable accommodation, without support from either 
statutory sources or case law from the Supreme Court.  In Morrissette-Brown, the court notes 
that Title VII does not define reasonably accommodation and thus relies on case law to 
 
155 Tabura, 880 F.3d at 551.  
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determine the standard.162  However, the court cites Ansonia to define the standard as 
eliminate.163  This analysis again relies only on the mention of the word “eliminate” by the 
Supreme Court and in the context of a potential accommodation that was deemed not to be 
reasonable.164  These courts interpreted a standard that, lacking both statutory and case law 
support, creates a higher burden on employers than the Civil Rights Act of 1964 imposes.  
Title VII demands that an employer reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious 
conflict, unless it can show that doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employer.  
Because neither reasonably accommodate nor undue burden is defined by the Act or the Supreme 
Court, lower courts are left to determine the standards.  Courts appear to be more willing to find 
a reasonable accommodation imposes an undue hardship on the employer rather than finding that 
the employer reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious conflict.165  However, even if 
the undue hardship is an easier hurdle to clear, the Act still does not impose an obligation to 
eliminate the conflict, absent an undue hardship. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This note argued that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that employers 
reasonably accommodate conflicts between work obligations and employees’ religious practices.  
The Act, however, does not require that employers must eliminate the burden to comply.  
Determining whether an employer is obligated to completely eliminate a conflict or reasonably 
accommodate it has significant implications for how employers handle religious accommodation. 
Title VII does not define what constitutes a reasonable accommodation and the Supreme Court 
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has not clarified the term, instead mentioning possible accommodations that could be considered 
reasonable.  The Supreme Court denied cert to review Patterson.166  The United States filed a 
brief amicus curiae and both Walgreens and Patterson filed supplemental briefs.167  In denying 
cert, the Court noted “the case raises important questions about the meaning of Title VII’s 
prohibition of employment discrimination.”168  The Court, however, then stated “that [Patterson] 
does not present a good vehicle for revisiting Hardison.169  Thus, until the Supreme Court 
clarifies further, based on a plain reading of the text of the Act and the lack of a definitive 
standard provided by the Supreme Court, employers should operate under the assumption that 
they are not required to eliminate the conflict, so long as they provide reasonable 
accommodations to their employees.   
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